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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE C 'F I J I1 MI,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.
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TARA KAY MAST,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000389-CA
Priority rio.
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STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
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A copy of the minutes of the "Sentence, Judgmei it,
Commitment," R 45 47, is attached as Addendum A.

restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999), by
ordering Ms. Mast to pay $5,090 in restitution related to a
burglary which she did not admit responsibility for, was not
charged with, and did not plead guilty to?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing a trial court's order of

restitution this Court generally examines whether the "'trial
court exceed [ed] the authority prescribed by law or abuse [d] its
discretion.'" State v. McBride, 940 P. 2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (quoting State v. Robinson, 860 P. 2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App.
1993)). However, where the propriety of the order depends upon
interpretation of the governing statute, this Court n"accord[s] a
lower court's statutory interpretations no particular deference
but assess [es] them for correctness, as [with] any other
conclusion of law.'" Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5,6
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ) .
Preservation of the Argument: The basis for this appeal is
preserved on the record at R. 71 [8-9] .

STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Did the order to pay $5,090 in restitution, where there
was neither an admission of responsibility nor a conviction of
the underlying crime, violate constitutional guarantees of due
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process?
Standard of Review: "'On review, we give no deference to the
trial court's determination that defendant's due process rights
were not violated; however, we presume that the factual findings
underlying that determination are correct.'" State v. Morgan,
2000 UT App. 48 %8, 997 P.2d 910 (quoting State v. Parra, 972
P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
Preservation of the Argument: The basis for this appeal is
preserved at R. 71 [9-10] .

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following provision from the United States Constitution
is relevant on appeal. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent
part:
. . . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .
U.S. Const, amend. V.
The following provision from the Utah Constitution is
relevant on appeal. Article 1, section 7 provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah Const., art. 1 § 7.
The following statute is determinative of the issue on
appeal.
3

Restitution, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999)
The full text of this statute is provided in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. Mast was charged by information with one count of
forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-501(1999), and one count of theft by receiving stolen
property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-408(1999). R. 2-4. The forgery charge was dismissed, R. 2,
R. 16-22, and Ms. Mast pled guilty to the charge of theft by
receiving stolen property. R. 23-24. Ms. Mast was sentenced on 28
August 2000 to three years of probation. R. 46. As a condition of
probation, Ms. Mast was ordered to pay "restitution as determined
by Probation Officer." R. 47. The judge clarified during the
sentencing that restitution included the amount of $5,090, the
total value of property that had been stolen from Mr. Curtis
Belnap [uMr. Belnap"] during a burglary of his house. R. 70 [4,
9] .
Ms. Mast made a motion to alter or amend judgment, asking
the trial court to strike "approximately $5,000 of restitution
related to a burglary that Ms. Mast has never been charged with,

4

convicted of, nor admitted responsibility to." R. 48. 2 A hearing
was held on 25 September 2000. R. 71. At the hearing, Ms. Mast
argued that under the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4) (a) (i) , she should be responsible only for those items she
was in possession of, and not all of the property taken in the
burglary. R. 71 [8-9] . The State countered that u the property is
a package as a whole and she's got part of it, she should get to
pay for all of it." R. 71 [9]. The trial court denied Ms. Mast's
motion. R. 65. Ms. Mast filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 5455.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The "Official Version of Offense" in the presentence
investigation report indicates the following:
On 3 February 2 000 a deputy from the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office responded to a call from the Super Target store
at 7025 South Park Center Drive. R. 72 [2] . Upon his arrival he
was told that store security personnel had detained someone,
later identified as Ms. Mast, who had presented a stolen check in
the amount of $109.75 for payment of her selections. Id. The
check was drawn on the account of Mr. Belnap, whose house in

2

The "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" is attached as
Addendum C.
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Holladay had been burgled. Id.
The deputy questioned Ms. Mast. After a few minutes, she
indicated that she wanted to visit the restroom, and he requested
that she give him a usmall black pouch" to check. Id. She
complied. The deputy discovered four men's rings and a gold
pocket watch, which Ms. Mast indicated were hers. Mr. Belnap was
contacted and he identified the jewelry as his property. Id.
The "Official Version of Offense" indicates that

u

[a]fter

being advised of her Miranda rights, Ms. Mast stated a male
friend had given her the checks and the jewelry, but she could
not remember his name or provide a description of him. She said
she was at the store with the friend and her 14-year-old
daughter. She advised the male individual had left the store and
told her daughter to tell her to pay for the items with one of
the checks he had given her. The defendant stated she knew the
checks were stolen. She said she knew Mr. Belnap but denied any
knowledge of the burglary." Id.
On 11 May 2000 Ms. Mast pleaded guilty to one count of theft
by receiving stolen property. R. 16-24. She admitted to being in
possession of four "rings and a pocket watch [together] worth
$1,020.00." R. 17. She did not, however, admit responsibility for
the burglary. See R. 16-24. Ms. Mast was sentenced to three years
of probation, with the condition that she pay restitution to Mr.
6

Belnap in the amount of $5,090. R. 46-47, R. 70 [9] .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
In ordering Ms. Mast to pay restitution for losses related
to the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house, the sentencing court
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1999). Under section 763-201, restitution may be ordered only if a defendant "has been
convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and
agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct."
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 1J3, 987 P.2d 1289. The
sentencing judge must focus solely upon the "firmly established
admission[s] of responsibility" and may not order restitution
based upon further inference. Id. %5.
Here, Ms. Mast admitted only that she had been in possession
of some items previously taken in the burglary of Mr. Belnap's
house. She has continually maintained that she had no knowledge
of the burglary, did not participate in the burglary, and did not
know who committed the burglary. See R. 16-22, R. 70 [4], R.
72 [2-3] . The sentencing court, in ordering Ms. Mast to pay
restitution for the entire amount of loss from the burglary,
erred by inferring responsibility based upon her admission of
theft by receiving stolen property combined with her inability to
provide further information about the burglary.
7

The court also erred in finding that Ms. Mast's "criminal
activity" of theft by receiving stolen property met an
unspecified "civil standard" required to impose restitution. R.
71 [12-13] . Where pecuniary damages stem from a crime separate
from the crime admitted by the defendant, the focus is on the
specific admissions made to the court, and not on an unspecified
"civil standard." Even applying the modified "but for" test
sometimes used to find responsibility for losses under section
76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), the order for restitution was erroneous. It cannot be
said that "but for" Ms. Mast's possession of checks, four rings,
and a pocket watch taken in the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house,
Mr. Belnap would not have incurred the loss in the burglary.
Additionally, the order for restitution violeited federal and
state constitutional guarantees of due process. Fundamental
principles of due process guarantee a defendant the right to
"examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the
factual information upon which his sentence is based." State v.
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994). When the sentence includes
an order for restitution, this guarantee remains applicable. In
the absence of a conviction where the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to answer and challenge the accusation, an order for
restitution may not be imposed unless there is an admission of
8

responsibility. "'For purposes of determining the basis of
restitution, the admission of a defendant is essentially the same
as a plea of guilty . . . .

Because such an admission can result

in liability for substantial sums of money, defendant's
responsibility for the criminal activities ought to be firmly
established." Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 %5.
Here, charges were not made, an opportunity to answer was
not afforded, no evidence was presented by either party, and Ms.
Mast was not convicted of the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house.
Further, Ms. Mast did not admit responsibility for the burglary.
The sentencing court simply inferred from Ms. Mast's admission of
theft by receiving stolen property and her inability to provide
further information about the burglary that she was responsible
for the entire amount of loss. R. 71 [10-12]. This failure to
afford Ms. Mast procedural due process is unconstitutional error
and should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE RESTITUTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201,
REQUIRES THE SENTENCING COURT TO FOCUS ON ADMISSIONS, AND
NOT ON INFERENCES OR AN UNSPECIFIED "CIVIL STANDARD," THE
RESTITUTION ORDER IMPOSED UPON MS. MAST WAS ERRONEOUS
In ordering Ms. Mast to pay restitution of $5,090, even

though she was not convicted of and did not admit responsibility

9

for the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house, see R. 16-22, the trial
court misinterpreted the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999) . Section 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) states:
When a person is convicted of a criminal activity that
has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime
as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as
part of a plea agreement. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999) .3 The statute defines
"criminal activities," as "any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant
admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an
admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(1) (b) (1999) .4
In interpreting this statute, this Court has indicated that,
u

[a] court may order restitution only if the defendant has been

convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and
agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct."
Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 %3 • Additionally, "the statute requires

3

In interpreting this statute, the ""fundamental rule of
statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed
according to their plain language.'" State Ex Re. N.K.C., 1999 UT
App. 345 19, 995 P.2d 1 (citation omitted).
4

Statutory definitions are a primary tool used in
determining plain meaning. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App. 273
f3, 987 P.2d 1289; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998).
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that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly
established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order
restitution." Id. at %5. Further, as under the Oregon restitution
statute that served as a model for the section 76-3-201, the
''formalities of an admission [must be] met before restitution can
be ordered." Id. (citing State v. Voetbergf 781 P.2d 387, 389
(Or. App. 1989)).
In this case, Ms. Mast was not ever convicted of and did not
ever admit responsibility for the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house.
She has always maintained that she had no knowledge of the
burglary, did not participate in the burglary, and did not know
who committed the burglary. See R. 16-22, R. 70 [4], R. 72 [2-3] .
Immediately before her arrest, she told police that a male friend
had given her the checks and jewelry. R. 72 [2] . Later, when Ms.
Mast pleaded guilty to the charge of theft by receiving stolen
property, she admitted only that she "possessed the items of a
former boyfriend, after they had been taken from his home in a
burglary. The items 4 rings and a pocket watch were worth over
$1,000.00." R. 17.

In the presentence investigation report, she

further explained:
A couple of friends of my ex-boyfriend came to my
apartment. They wanted me to go shopping with them.
They had some jewelry that they gave me, we were all
very high on meth. I went up to Target. The guy said he
had some checks of his and we could buy some things we

11

needed. When it came time to cash the check he gave it
to me and left. I thought it was his check but it
wasn't. They come from a burglary that was done earlier
. . . . The jewelry in my purse was also from the
burglary.
R. 72 [3] . During her sentencing, the sentencing judge asked "Who
actually did the burglary at Belnap's home, do you know?" R. 70
[4]. Ms. Mast responded, "I don't know. It - I don't know. It
wasn't me, I was not up there." Id.
Nevertheless, the sentencing court imposed an order of
restitution for $5,090, the entire amount of loss in the burglary
of Mr. Belnap's house. The court based its decision upon the
reasoning that, under an unspecified

xx

civil standard" Ms. Mast

was liable for the entire amount of loss. The court also stated:
There, it seems to me, is such a close nexus in terms
of time [between the burglary and when Ms. Mast was
discovered with the checks and jewelry] and there is
such a [n] insufficient explanation for how she acquired
[the 4 rings and pocket watch] and it appears on the
face of it to be just simply unreasonable and
unbelievable, frankly. And Ms. Mast's refusal to
provide any additional information on which I could - I
could base any other ruling, I'll find that the State
through the pre[]sentence report in fact has
established to a sufficient civil standard, [] Ms.
Mast's participation in a criminal activity resulting
in an economic loss . . . .
R. 71 [12-13]. This ruling is erroneous because the court looked
beyond the admitted crime and based its ruling upon inferences
made from the "close nexus in terms of time" and Ms. Mast's
failure to provide further information regarding the person or
12

persons who gave her the stolen items.
In State v. Watson this Court ruled that an order of
restitution based upon inferences extending beyond the specific
admission made to the sentencing court was not consistent with
section 76-3-201. Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 ^5,

987 P.2d 1289. In

Watson, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of
justice after allegedly driving two other suspects to and from a
crime scene. Id. at %2. She also admitted to selling the car used
in the crime. Id.
The sentencing court ordered her to pay restitution to the
Victim's Reparation Fund for money it gave to the victim's family
for counseling. Id. at %1. In issuing this order, the sentencing
court stated:
[T]he defendant did admit to the responsibility of
driving this vehicle. And in this court's opinion also,
[defense counsel] , in spite of the fact that you
maintain that some of the facts are disputed, I am just
of the opinion that there are sufficient facts,
substantial as they may be, which are reflective of the
defendant's state of mind in this particular case;
i.e., hearing the shots, individuals running towards
the vehicle, her admission that she drove the vehicle
away. In this court's opinion [that] is sufficient
nexus to hold her accountable for restitution . . . .
Id. at f4. This Court reversed that order, clarifying that "the
statute is more narrow." Id. at f5. Specifically, the statute
"does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of
mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the

13

sentencing court." Id. Because the defendant admitted only to the
obstruction of justice charge; and there was no "firmly
established admission of responsibility upon which to order
Watson to pay restitution," this Court reversed. Id. at f5.
Similarly, in State v. Galli, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the sentencing court incorrectly interpreted section 76-32 01 in ordering the defendant to pay restitution to his family
for bail money they forfeited when he absconded from the
jurisdiction after being released on bail. Galli, 967 P. 2d 930,
937-38 (Utah 1998) . The Court observed that "Galli was neither
charged nor convicted of bail jumping . . . . Thus, the only way
that his family could be victims of bail jumping would be if
Galli admitted responsibility for this crime to Judge Brian." Id.
Although Galli's defense counsel made statements admitting bail
jumping, Galli himself did not, and therefore restitution was not
proper under section 76-3-201. Id.
In this case, Ms. Mast has already restored the items which
she was in possession of, R. 71 [9],5 and the only basis for

5

Under the plain language of section 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , Ms.
Mast can be ordered to make restitution only for pecuniary
damages resulting from her admitted crime of theft by receiving
stolen property. See Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 if3. In her plea
agreement, she admitted that she had ". . .4) received the
property of Curtis Belnap 5) knowing the property had been stolen
6) intending to deprive the owner 7) property consisting of 4
rings and a pocket watch worth $1,020.00." R. 17. Ms. Mast also

14

ordering further restitution is the burglary of Mr. Belnap's
house. Ms. Mast was not convicted of and did not admit
responsibility for that burglary. See R. 16-22. The trial court
found responsibility for losses from that burglary solely on the
basis of inferences from Ms. Mast's inability to provide further
information concerning the burglary. This was erroneous because
Section 76-3-201 does not contemplate restitution based upon
inferences or speculation.
Additionally, the sentencing court's order for restitution
is erroneous because of the application of an unspecified "civil
standard" to Ms. Mast's "criminal activity" of theft by receiving
stolen property. The sentencing court's focus on this standard
apparently stems from the definition of "pecuniary damages" in
the restitution statute. "Pecuniary damages" are defined as "all
special damages, but not general damages, which a person could
recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal
activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including
earnings and medical expenses." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

admitted, through her attorney, responsibility for these items.
R. 71 [9] . However, she specifically disclaimed responsibility
for the value of the remaining losses from the burglery. R. 71
[8-9] .

15

201(1)(c)(1999).
Under this definition, this Court has found that "a modified
x

but for' test is appropriate in the context of a restitution

hearing . . . ." State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) . Generally, this test is applied in cases where crimes
of negligence are at issue because of the difficulty of
determining whether damages resulted from the act of negligence.6
The test is also used to determine whether parties are victims
entitled to retribution under the statute.7
However, where the crime is one of criminal intent rather
than negligence, the modified "but for" test is not useful
because pecuniary damages are easier to trace, or not trace, to
the crime.8 The focus turns to the specific admissions made to
6

See e.g. McBride, 940 P. 2d at 544 (Where defendant was
convicted of joyriding, this Court applied a "modified xbut for'
test" to determine whether restitution was appropriate) ; State v.
Robinson, 860 P. 2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Unlike most
criminal matters, these traffic cases involve numerous issues
that must be considered before it can be determined whether a
victim 'has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the
defendant's criminal activities.'")
7

See e.g. State v. DepaoLi, 835 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah
1992) ("Because the cost of the [rape examination] could not be
recovered by the SLCPD in a civil action against defendant, the
SLCPD has not sustained pecuniary damages as defined by our
statute and therefore is not a victim.")
8

See e.g Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 1|5 ("Without making
inferences as the trial court did, it cannot be said that Watson
admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she agree to pay
restitution. Watson only admitted and pleaded guilty to the

16

the court, and not to the modified "but for" test.9 In this case,
the sentencing court focused on an unspecified "civil standard"
in ordering restitution. The court reasoned that, "as the finder
of fact and sentencing judge in this matter . . . should I go
beyond the specific offense for which she was convicted, i.e.,
theft by receiving? I think the answer is yes, but only if there
is to at least a civil standard, a showing that the-of the
criminal activity, part of which was the specific offense for
which she was convicted." R. 71 [12]. The sentencing court found
that the information in the presentence investigation report met
the "civil standard," R. 71 [13], and restitution was imposed.
Because the sentencing court focused on this unspecified "civil
standard" in ordering restitution, rather than on the specific

obstruction of justice charge for which there were no pecuniary
damages. Thus, there was no firmly established admission of
responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay restitution.");
State v. Simonette, 881 P.2d 963, 964 (Utah 1994) (Where child
sustained damages for physical abuse, and defendant admitted
physically abusing the child, trial court properly ordered
restitution even though defendant was not convicted of the crime
of abusing the child.)
9

See e.g. Galli, 967 P.2d at 937(Foregoing a "but for"
analysis, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "Galli was neither
charged nor convicted of bail jumping . . . . Thus, the only way
that his family could be victims of bail jumping would be if
Galli admitted responsibility for this crime to Judge Brian.");
Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 %5, (In rejecting the sentencing court's
order of restitution based upon a "but for" test, this Court
stated, "the statute requires that responsibility for the
criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea,
before the court can order restitution.")
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admissions made before the court, the order for restitution was
erroneous.
Finally, even applying the modified "but for" test, the
order for restitution was erroneous. That test, adopted from an
Oregon court, indicates that

VkX

if the loss 'resulted,' in a 'but

for' sense, from defendant's criminal activities,'" restitution
is proper in the amount

ux

equivalent of the property for the

taking or destruction of which the defendant could be found
civil[l]y liable.'" McBride, 940 P. 2d at 544 (quoting State v.
Doty, 653 P.2d 276, 277-78 (1982)). Here, it cannot be said that
"but for" Ms. Mast's acceptance of the checks, rings, and pocket
watch from a friend, Mr. Belnap's losses from an earlier burglary
would not have resulted. Mr. Belnap's losses from the burglary
were not the result of Ms. Mast's admitted crime of theft by
receiving stolen property. Indeed, Ms. Mast did not even commit
her admitted crime until after the losses were incurred.
Therefore, the order for restitution was erroneous.

II.

THE ORDER IMPOSING RESTITUTION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS BECAUSE MS. MAST, WHO DID NOT ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE RELATED BURGLARY, WAS NOT CHARGED WITH, PROVEN
GUILTY OF, OR CONVICTED OF THE BURGLARY
Without the protections of procedural due process, Ms. Mast

did not have the opportunity to answer the charge of burglary,
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she could not confront witnesses or present evidence on her
behalf, and she was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Procedural Due Process is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const., art. 1 §
7. The United States Supreme Court has declared that

xx

[e]very

person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the
Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in
accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees." Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d
524 (1991) .10
With regard to the imposition of restitution, this Court has
indicated that

xx

[t]he demands of due process rest on the concept

of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate
to the case and just to the parties involved." State v. Robinson,
860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted).

10

The Court has also declared, xx [d] ating back to Magna Carta
. . . it has been an abiding principle governing the lives of
civilized men that x no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or
disseised or outlawed or exiled . . . without the judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land . . . . (Footnote omitted) . What
we hold is only that, in keeping with this cherished tradition,
punishment cannot be imposed 'without due process of law.' Any
lesser holding would ignore the constitutional mandate upon which
our essential liberties depend." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 186 (1963) .
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Further,

u

[o]ne of the fundamental requisites of due process is

the opportunity to be fully heard." Id. (citations omitted).
Specifically, Me]very significant deprivation, whether permanent
or temporary, of an interest, which is qualified as 'property'
under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,
absent extraordinary or unusual circumstances." Id. (citations
omitted).
In this case, procedural due process was not followed.
Charges of the underlying burglary were not made, an opportunity
to answer was not afforded, no evidence was presented by either
the State or Ms. Mast, and Ms. Mast was not convicted of the
burglary. During the hearing on Ms. Mast's motion to alter or
amend judgment, the court, acknowledging that the State could not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Mast committed the
burglary, R. 71 [10] /11 based its imposition of restitution upon
an inference of responsibility. See R. 71 [10-12] . The court also
indicated that it found that Ms. Mast's "criminal activity" of
theft by receiving stolen property met an unspecified "civil

11

During the hearing on Ms. Mast's motion to alter or amend
judgment, the sentencing judge indicated that "There's absolutely
no way [the State] could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she
committed the burglary, they can't put her at the crime scene,
either. She's presumed innocent. There is no plausible way that
she should be charged with the burglary . . . ." R. 71 [10] .
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standard" required to impose restitution under the restitution
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1999). R. 71 [12-13].
The sentencing court's ruling violates procedural due
process because due process requires more than an inference of
responsibility during a sentencing proceeding on another
matter.12 With regard to sentencing proceedings, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that federal and state due process entitles a
defendant "to due process protections during sentencing to
prevent procedural unfairness." State v. Gomez, 887 P. 2d 853,
854-55 (Utah 1994). In fact, "[p]rocedural fairness is equally
mandated at the sentencing phase as at the guilt phase of a
trial." State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986). Further,
"[fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing

When a defendant has not admitted responsibility for a
crime, or been convicted of the crime, the Utah Supreme Court has
held it a violation of due process to impose restitution. See ie
State in Interest of Schroeder, 598 P.2d 373, 374-75 (Utah
1979)(Where a juvenile admitted to damaging a motor home, M i ] t
seems to us that it would be a distortion of justice, and of due
process, for the court to simply assume that other damages caused
in the area (in this instance the other four motor homes) were
chargeable to wrongful conduct of this juvenile; and to impose
that damage as a penalty where, as is the situation here, there
was no evidence offered, and no admission of guilt on his part,
upon which to place upon him the responsibility for that
damage."); In the Matter of Cache Valley Syndicate Trust, 587
P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 1978) ("It is not consistent with established
concepts of equity or due process . . . for the court to
disfranchise . . . without evidence in support thereof" the wife
of a trust employee who pleaded guilty to charges of felonious
misconduct with regard to management of the trust.)

21

require that a defendant have the right to examine and challenge
the accuracy and reliability of the facutal information upon
which his sentence is based." Gomez, 887 P. 2d at 855. Finally,
w

[w] here it is shown on appeal that the belief that the defendant

may have committed a crime on another occasion is without
support," sentences have been vacated. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d
115, 118 n.2 (Utah 1985)(citations omitted).
In this case, there is no basis for making Ms,. Mast
responsible for losses related to the burglary of Mr. Belnap's
house. Although Ms. Mast admitted to theft by receiving stolen
property, she returned the property which she had been in
possession of. R. 71 [9]. Inferences of responsibility for losses
from the underlying burglary cire not permissible under principles
of due process. No evidence concerning the burglary was
presented, no opportunity to challenge the evidence was given,
and Ms. Mast has continually maintained her lack of knowledge
regarding the burglary. See R. 16-22, R. 70 [4], R. 72 [2-3] . Most
significantly, no admission of responsibility for the burglary
was made. A formal admission of responsibility is required under
principles of due process because

xxx

[f]or the purposes of

determining the basis for restitution, the admission of a
defendant is essentially the same as a plea of guilty

....

Because such an admission can. result in liability for substantial
22

sums of money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal
activities ought to be firmly established." Watson, 1999 UT App.
273 %5. Because Ms. Mast did not admit responsibility for the
burglary underlying Mr. Belnap's losses, the order to pay
restitution violates procedural due process.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Mast respectfully requests that the order imposing
restitution be reversed. The sentencing court's imposition of the
order as a condition of Ms. Mast's probation constitutes a
misinterpretation of the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999) . Additionally, the order violates
constitutional guarantees of due process because there was not an
admission of responsibility, and Ms. Mast was not charged with or
convicted of the underlying crime.
tltt
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001903706 FS

TARA KAY MAST,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
August 28, 2 000

PRESENT
Clerk:
chandeei
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ELDRIDGE, JARED W.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 3, 1968
Video
Tape Count: 2:14
CHARGES
2. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JA#L
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 180 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.

00045
Page 1

Case No: 001903706
Date:
Aug 28, 2000
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
C/o deft to serve 180 days jail, cts, concurrent.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$1000 00
$1000 .00
$

$1000 .00
$1000 .00
$0
$0
plus :Lnterest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDARS
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole,
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Page 2
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Case No: 001903706
Date:
Aug 28, 2000
Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Report regularly
Maintain fulltime employment

Page 3 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities* means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) ''Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil ppnalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.

(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part, of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the comity to which he has been
returned, the com! may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).

(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in

the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstainces promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law..
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.

